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1. Introduction 
     This paper examines the price behaviour of the precious metals gold, silver, 
platinum and palladium before, during and in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial 
crisis. Our interest stems firstly from the empirical observation that there was a 
sustained pre-crisis run-up in the prices of precious metals and other commodities 
prior to a sharp, downward adjustment in the midst of the crisis in 2008. The post-
crisis data indicate that all four metals eventually enjoyed price run-ups that 
superseded pre-crisis levels, and experienced some sharp, downward adjustments at 
various points. In our analysis of precious metals prices, we therefore test for 
departures in trend that offer evidence of periods of exuberance and collapse, possibly 
on multiple occasions during the sample period. In particular, we examine whether 
any of the metals prices exhibited bubble behaviour, by which we mean changes 
beyond the fundamental variables that economic theory suggests underlie them. This 
issue is important from a policy perspective; for if prices are seen to diverge from 
fundamental values, this may indicate speculative behaviour on the part of economic 
agents. Within the class of commodities, it is especially relevant for precious metals 
because of their perceived role as investment assets. 
     We focus particularly on the behaviour of precious metals around the financial 
crisis.  In the aftermath of the crisis, policymakers have sought to limit the speculative 
activities of economic agents, seeing these as being contributory to (past and potential 
future) financial crises. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act introduced in the United States, which allows the regulator to limit 
position sizes in certain U.S. commodity futures markets, is the canonical example in 
this regard. If this policy-based intervention were based on incorrectly perceived 
speculation when the market is truly efficient, it may produce misleading price signals 
that are welfare reducing through a maligning effect on the allocative efficiency of the 
market. It is therefore important that the issue of identifying fundamentals-based price 
behaviour and non-fundamentals-based speculation is put on a proper evidential basis 
through statistical testing, such as is provided by this paper. 
     Our analysis of precious metals prices is more extensive than simply an assessment 
of whether prices during the sampling period were determined by fundamentals or 
speculation. More broadly, we seek to provide a comprehensive description and 
explanation of the key time series properties of the precious metals complex around 
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the financial crisis. Towards this end, we apply the mildly explosive/bubbles detection 
technology recently proposed by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a&b: PSYa&b), which 
offers a basis upon which to test for departures in trend in the direction of mildly 
explosive alternatives, in a way that is robust to multiple and/or periodically 
collapsing bubbles of the type discussed by Evans (1991). The technology also offers 
a statistically consistent basis upon which to date the origination and collapse of 
bubbles. Here, we are interested in whether the precious metals complex as a whole, 
or any of gold, silver, platinum or palladium in particular, exhibited any of the type of 
price exuberant behaviour documented in other commodity markets in the run-up to 
the financial crisis.1 We are also interested in whether there was any marked or 
exceptional behaviour during and in the aftermath of the crisis when economic 
policymaking was non-standard, given the various special properties such as “store of 
value”, “safe haven status” or “hedge against inflation” that are typically ascribed to 
the precious metals to varying degrees. 
     The PSY procedure identifies mildly explosive periods in the sample that indicate 
departures from trend, which are then assessed using proxy variables thought to 
represent economic fundamentals for bubble behaviour (by which we mean behaviour 
that indicates departure from “fundamental value”). In the pioneering paper, Phillips, 
Wu and Yu (2011, PWY) used dividend yield as the natural fundamental proxy 
variable for the NASDAQ stock price index.  Specifically, the ratio of the NASDAQ 
index and dividend yield on the basis of monthly data was used to test whether there 
was a non-fundamentals-based departure from trend in the form of explosivity in 
NASDAQ stock prices. As Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) explain, this procedure is 
impractical to apply to commodities because the ratio of commodity prices and the 
natural counterpart to dividend yield – convenience yield – becomes uninformative 
when the convenience yield approaches zero, which it can do for perfectly natural 
reasons. We demonstrate that this same problem affects precious metals, where the 
measured convenience yield can be low or even negatively valued, making the ratio 
between the commodity price and measured convenience yield uninterpretable. 
     A second reason for our needing a broader approach towards fundamentals than in 
PWY (2011) is that we here focus on higher frequency (weekly) data, which enables 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., applications to agricultural commodities by Etienne et al. (2014, 2015) and to non-ferrous 
metals by Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015). 
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us to test for potentially relevant, shorter periods of mild explosivity in prices than 
monthly data would permit, but this comes at a cost because many natural 
fundamentals proxy variables such as industrial production, which might permit a 
distinction between gold and silver, are usually collected at the monthly frequency at 
best.2 Accordingly, the interpretation of our results, while always evidence-based, is 
to some extent pieced together using a variety of sources. These include, however, 
position data that allow for a direct test for speculative behaviour in each of the four 
precious metals. Here, we have preferred to employ as candidate proxy variables the 
fundamentals that have been specifically proposed in the precious metals literature, 
such as gold lease rates, convenience yield and bar hoarding, along with some 
reference to the macroeconomic and financial environment, rather than to employ a 
more data-based approach, such as Batten et al. (2010) proposed for gold, which 
assessed a large number of potential proxy variables in a data-based manner.  This 
type of data-based approach is more feasible for monthly data and is currently the 
subject of work by the authors that is complementary to this paper. 
     The advent of the PWY/PSY technology has finally addressed the statistical 
problems in bubbles testing that were identified by Evans (1991) in the seminal tests 
proposed by Diba and Grossman (1984, 1988) based on the standard application of 
unit root and co-integration tests, that were applied to gold inter alia.  This has 
brought efficacy to recent empirical work on bubbles testing.  In the context of 
precious metals, Homm and Breitung (2012) applied the prototype PWY (2011) test 
to real gold prices over a sample between January 1985 and November 2010 and 
found no evidence for a mildly explosive region at any significance level. They also 
applied an alternative, Chow-type test which was significant at the 10% level for both 
weekly and monthly data. In preliminary work for UNCTAD, Gilbert (2010) used the 
same prototype PWY test during a different sampling period – just the 2006-08 crisis 
– and reported no mildly explosive episodes in gold and silver, his representatives of 
the previous metals complex. And again using same test, but over a different sample 
period, Baur and Glover (2015) found evidence for mild explosivity in nominal 
monthly prices in gold in the decade from around 2002 that was punctuated by the 
                                                          
2 The results we obtained using monthly data were qualitatively the same as for weekly data but there 
was evidence to suggest the algorithm to detect mildly explosive periods was less accurate. Results are 
available from the authors on request. Research on the behavior of the PSY test applied to the same 
series sampled at different frequencies is currently being undertaken by the second author. 
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financial crisis.  Harvey et al. (2016) used the PWY test to identify numbers of mildly 
explosive episodes in gold, silver and platinum in a paper focussed on making the test 
robust to changes in volatility during the sample period, but without date-stamping 
explosive periods. Their robust tests based on weekly data find at least one mildly 
explosive region in all three metals at the 10% significance level but only in silver at 
the 5% level. 
     Two recent papers have applied an early version of the PSY procedure to gold.3  
Zhao et al. (2015) considered a sample period from January 1973 – March 2014 using 
nominal monthly spot prices and identified five mildly explosive periods in gold, 
including the periods October 2007-August 2008 and September 2009-April 2013.  
Long et al. (2016) considered the period April 1, 1968 – August 6, 2013 using 
biweekly nominal spot prices obtained by averaging daily data, and identified five 
similar mildly explosive periods, including November 2007-July 2008 and April 
2010-February 2012.  None of the above papers, whether based on the PWY or PSY 
procedures, test for departures in prices from fundamental values.4 
     Other tests for mildly explosive/bubble behaviour involving precious metals, but 
not using the PWY/PSY methodology, include Bialkowski et al. (2015) who used a 
regime-switching model alongside various proposed measures of fundamental value. 
Although their results were sensitive to the choice of fundamental, they registered 
recent association between the gold price and the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Lucey and O’Connor (2013) also used a regime-switching approach but considered 
lease rates – the interest that can be earned by lending the physical metal at various 
maturities – as the measure of fundamental value. They reported some evidence for 
bubbles, but only when the variance was constant across regimes. Barone-Adesi et al. 
(2014) also used lease rates to assess speculative behaviour in gold. In a notable 
earlier paper, Bertus and Stanhouse (2001) constructed a supply-demand model for 
                                                          
3 Both papers used the procedure outlined in Phillips et al. (2012), which differs from the final version 
which offers a rule based on size and power considerations for selecting the smallest sample width 
fraction, r0, upon which the key statistics used in the paper depend. 
4 Baur and Glover (2015) argue that mildly explosive periods can be equated with speculation and 
propose their own framework for defining bubbles based on heterogeneous agents. Figuerola-Ferretti et 
al. (2015) offered a context, however, in which inelastic mine supply combined with fluctuating 
demand saw departures in non-ferrous metals prices from the random walk with drift model that could 
be explained by a standard stock-to-use-ratio fundamental. We prefer, therefore, to follow the PSY 
approach to bubbles, in terms of their representing departure from fundamental value. The PSY 
procedure encompasses rational bubbles, intrinsic bubbles, herd behavior and time-varying discount 
factor fundamentals. See Footnote 5, p. 1045 in PSY (2015a). 
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gold based on dynamic factor analysis and, using quarterly data, found little evidence 
for long bubbles using conventional significance levels. If the stringency of the testing 
is relaxed, they documented some support for shorter bubbles around significant 
periods such as the worldwide stock market crash on Black Monday (19th October 
1987). Emekter et al. (2012) found that 11 of 28 commodities, including gold and 
platinum, but not silver and palladium, showed evidence of bubbles using a duration 
dependence test and the interest-adjusted basis as a proxy for convenience yield.5 
     This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  Firstly, we offer a 
balanced treatment of the properties and underpinnings of the precious metals 
complex before, during and in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, in what we 
believe is the most comprehensive such study to date. Looking at the four main metals 
furnishes us with a wider lens through which we can examine the financial crisis than 
can be achieved by looking at, say, just gold alone. Secondly, we use the PSY 
(2015a&b) test procedure to examine the mild explosivity/bubbles properties of the 
precious metals complex during the crisis. Statistically, this procedure supersedes 
both the original PWY (2011) procedure and the improved, sequential version 
proposed by PSY (2015a) in its robustness to testing for multiple and/or periodically-
collapsing bubbles. And thirdly, we offer an evidence-based assessment of whether 
prices departed from fundamental values in the spirit of the PSY approach.  Our work 
is distinguished from the two recent applications of the PSY test by Zhao et al. (2015) 
and Long et al. (2016) through the detail of its focus on the financial crisis; its 
consideration of both spot and futures prices; its treatment of the precious metals 
complex as a whole; its evidence-based approach in assessing fundamentals and 
speculation; and in the robustness of its analysis to a potentially changing dollar 
numeraire. 
      The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the four main precious 
metals and describes their raw time series properties during the sample period. Section 
3 briefly discusses the supply and demand constituents of the precious metals. Section 
4 summarizes the PSY bubbles-testing methodology including the wild bootstrap 
procedure justified for the PWY test by Harvey et al. (2016).  In Section 5, the PSY 
test is applied to raw spot and futures nominal price series for each metal, and series 
                                                          
5 The interest-adjusted basis is derived from the difference between the current spot price and the 
contemporaneous futures price, net of interest. 
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deflated by the currency value of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket and by the 
U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI). In Section 6, we offer some interpretation and 
analysis based on fundamentals proxy variables and Commitments of Traders (CoT) 
position data published by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC). Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Precious metals prices since 2000 
     We consider spot and front-month (one-month) weekly COMEX prices from the 
beginning of the last decade until the end of 2013 for the four major precious metals: 
gold, silver, platinum, and palladium.6  The appropriateness of considering the front-
month contract stems from its being the most liquid futures contract. Precious metals 
are by tradition traded in U.S. dollars per troy ounce (oz). Because the dollar as 
numeraire is itself changing, it is possible that inflation and other monetary variables 
have real effects, as could the value of the dollar exchange rate. This consideration is 
likely to be more important for precious metals, which to various degrees play the role 
of investment assets, than it is for, say, agricultural commodities. For robustness, we 
therefore also consider the spot and futures prices deflated by the currency value of 
the SDR basket, and by the U.S. PPI.7  Our primary data source is the Bloomberg 
International database. 
     We shall informally divide the sample into three periods of interest, notionally 
corresponding to periods before, during and after the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, 
many commodity prices began showing significant rises from as early as around mid-
2003, then sharper rises and possibly some exuberance, especially from late 2007 and 
                                                          
6 The COMEX exchange in New York currently operates as a designated contract market of the CME 
Group, the world’s largest and most diverse options and futures market place. Precious metals are 
predominantly traded on the London Bullion Market (gold and silver), the London Platinum and 
Palladium Market, and COMEX. The former two are the metals’ main physical markets where a 
bidding process generates daily reference prices for each metal.  Fund activity is mainly concentrated 
on COMEX. We shall, however, use both spot and futures COMEX prices to avoid any potential non-
synchronous trading issues, given that we later discuss convenience yield which is a function of both 
spot and futures prices at a given point in time. 
 
7 The currency value of the SDR is determined using a basket of major currencies (the U.S. dollar, the 
Euro, Japanese Yen and pound sterling) based on market exchange rates. Adjusting nominal world 
price series by the SDR currency value or the PPI index confers some robustness on our approach but it 
is not definitive: prices can rise in one currency and fall in another, and using a U.S. price index is 
merely one approach, albeit the usual one, to deflate world prices denominated in dollars. For wont of a 
better alternative, Deaton and Laroque (1996) in their celebrated paper deflated commodity prices by 
the U.S. Consumer Price Index and the literature has followed their lead. Here, however, we have 
deflated by the U.S. PPI index so that our results can be directly compared with those by Figuerola-
Ferretti et al. (2015a) in their study of non-ferrous metals prices, where it was natural to use an index 
constructed at the wholesale/producer stage. 
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into 2008.  Indeed, it was during the early part of this period, around or even just 
before the nascent growth in U.S. subprime mortgage lending (whose later accelerated 
growth and collapse many investigators believe played a precipitant role in the crisis) 
that the then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke publicly asked the question 
that has motivated much post-crisis research: 
 
 
“Can the Federal Reserve (or any central bank) reliably identify ‘bubbles’ in the prices of 
some assets, such as equities and real estate? And, if it can, what if anything should it do 
about them?”8 
 
One important question we address, therefore, is whether, and to what extent, precious 
metals were prone to bubble-like behaviour in the run-up to the financial crisis.  We 
test for possible departures in trend in each metal in the direction of mild explosivity 
and then assess through the lens of the financial crisis whether there is evidence that 
points towards any such departures being fundamentals-based or speculatively driven.  
Our aim is therefore more specific than a study of the financial crisis per se and, given 
that the precise dates of its active phase are open to interpretation we will limit 
ourselves to assessing our findings against a timeline of events we now describe. 
     The key events in the 2007-08 financial crisis are likely to have stemmed from the 
U.S. housing crisis that was deepening in early 2007. In late-February, the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, announced it would no longer 
purchase the most risky subprime mortgage loans. In June, The Bear Stearns 
Companies, Inc., a New York-based investment bank and securities trading and 
brokerage firm, pledged a collateralized loan to bail out one of its hedge funds. Three 
weeks later, Bear Stearns disclosed two of its subprime hedge funds had lost nearly all 
their value given the decline in the market for subprime mortgages. They were 
liquidated on July 31, sparking action against Bear Stearns and contagion effects that 
would go on to affect credit markets and the real economy. 
     We are particularly interested in the timeline of 2008, where there was an initial 
run-up in all four precious metals prices and generally across the commodities sector 
as the financial crisis developed.  In January and February, there was also a notable 
South African power crisis that affected platinum and palladium mine production.  In 
March, the U.S. Federal Reserve agreed to guarantee $30bn of Bear Stearns assets in 
connection with the government-sponsored sale of the investment bank to JP Morgan 
Chase & Co., a multinational banking and financial services holding company that is 
                                                          
8 http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2002/20021015/default.htm  
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the largest bank in the U.S.  In the background, the dollar had been depreciating and 
the oil price rising, and in mid-July the dollar hit a record low against the Euro around 
the same time as the oil price hit a record high. Precious metals prices began declining 
in the second quarter. We shall therefore assess whether there are fundamentals that 
give an indication as to why prices fell at the most acute stage of the crisis, given that 
this price behaviour would appear to contradict the safe-haven status usually accorded 
to precious metals. In early-September, the U.S. government took control of Freddie 
Mac and its sister mortgage finance company, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, Fannie Mae, to aid the distressed housing market. On September 15, the 
day many investigators including Phillips and Yu (2011) dated as the key point of the 
crisis, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., a global financial services firm, filed for 
bankruptcy amid a collapse in the junk bond market.  This was the largest investment 
bank to fail in the U.S. for nearly twenty years, and sparked off contagion effects.  A 
small spike is seen in the gold price during September, but not a rally, and again gold 
and other precious metals remained subdued. We will report evidence that supports 
the conjecture that the fall in investment demand in precious metals, and in gold in 
particular, arose from positions being unwound to facilitate margin calls in more 
traditional financial assets.  In late-September, the U.S. government rejected a $700bn 
Wall Street financial rescue package causing a severe stock market dip, but managed 
to pass a revised version of this package, called the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), on October 3. Precious metals showed some recovery in the aftermath of its 
imposition, and rallied into the following year, even although from December 2008, 
the U.S. economy became officially in recession. 
     In the aftermath of the 2007-08 period, we focus more widely on worldwide events 
that may have influenced precious metals prices. In March, the U.S. Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) decided to increase substantially the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet by purchasing (an additional) £750bn of mortgage-backed securities and 
announcing the purchase of $300bn of longer-term U.S. Treasury securities over the 
following six months. In April, China revealed a 454-tonne increase in its gold 
reserves.  In August, in the context of rising gold prices, the IMF approved the sale of 
403.3 tonnes gold; and in October, India bought 200 tonnes from them. In 2010, 
concerns began to mount over financial instability in Europe, with sovereign debt 
playing a key role in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and especially Greece and Spain. 
Bialkowski et al. (2015) found association between the gold price and the European 
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sovereign debt crisis when the latter acted as a fundamental, although as noted above, 
their results were sensitive to the choice of fundamental. We are also interested to see 
whether there was any departure in trend in precious metals complex as a whole 
around this time and, if so, whether this associates with the timeline of the European 
sovereign debt crisis during its peak period between February and June. Other 
important events in 2010 included, in early-November, the FOMC announcing a 
second round of quantitative easing (QE2), this time buying $600bn of U.S. Treasury 
securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011. 
     The main events in 2011 pertaining to precious metals included the Greek 
government’s passing austerity cuts in June, bringing some stability to the Eurozone; 
the credit ratings agency Standard and Poor’s downgrade of U.S. sovereign debt in 
August; and, after earlier disagreements, the FOMC announcement in September of 
“Operation Twist” involving the purchase of $400bn of U.S. securities with long 
maturities and the sale of securities with maturities of less than 3 years, in a bid to 
extend the average maturity of the Federal Reserve’s own portfolio. This programme 
was a precursor of the eventually-agreed third quantitative easing programme (QE3). 
We shall see that gold and silver prices in 2011 to some extent were correlated with 
the macroeconomic environment, but there were also relevant demand-side 
considerations, especially for silver. No departures from trend in any precious metal 
were detected after 2011.  
     The key properties of the raw spot price series across the main markets during the 
sample period are as follows.9 
[Figure 1A around here] 
2.1. Gold 
 
     In 2000, the gold price averaged around $280/oz, fell around 3% in 2001 and then 
rose just under 15% in 2002.  In 2003, gold began what would become a sustained 
rise in prices up to the financial crisis, and ended the year at a high of over $400. 
After a solid year in 2004, gold began to rise more spectacularly towards the end of 
2005, breaching the $500 mark and the price then rose sharply, reaching around $725 
– a 26-year nominal high – in mid-May 2006, before a correction.  The gains in silver 
in the second quarter of 2006 were even more spectacular. In 2007, the gold price 
advanced strongly, in November reaching around $840, just below its all-time 
                                                          
9 Source material for the following subsections, beyond the data themselves, include the annual GFMS 
Gold Surveys, The Silver Institute’s World Silver Surveys and Johnson Matthey’s Platinum Reports. 
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nominal high of $850 in January 1980, before falling back slightly. The general, 
sustained rise in gold continued, however, and in March 2008, in the run-up to the 
financial crisis, gold posted a (London) nominal high of $1,011.25 just before the 
collapse of Bear Stearns. Another price spike was seen in July (around the time the oil 
price hit a record high).  The general picture in later 2008, however, saw the gold 
price come under sustained pressure as the financial crisis unfolded, spiking again just 
briefly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, before falling to nearly $700 in 
October.  Prices then gained again in December such that, overall, the average annual 
price rose in 2008 for what was the seventh consecutive year.  It rose again in 2009 
(from a relatively low base) by nearly a quarter, with a fourth-quarter rally taking the 
price to a new nominal record high of over $1,200.  In 2010, prices again rallied after 
a subdued first quarter but gains were much less than for silver and copper (in the 
context of recovering post-crisis industrial base). 2011 saw the annual average price 
increasing for a tenth consecutive year and, by just below 30%, was largest 
proportionate increase since 2006. Prices rose steadily from February to June, then 
rapidly in July and August, reaching a high in early September of nearly $1,900 
before falling back to an extent, during a time when monetary issues were very much 
in consideration. Silver showed a similar price pattern, with its rise in the first three 
quarters even sharper than gold’s. In 2012, the gold price rallied until late February, 
declined until mid-May, traded within a narrow band until August, and rallied in 
August and September. The period was characterized by protracted U.S. 
congressional wrangling over the budget deficit. 2013 finally witnessed the end to the 
twelve-year bull-run in gold prices, with the annual average price falling by over 15%. 
Two violent drops in the first half of 2013 pushed the spot price below $1,200 on 
separate occasions. 
2.2. Silver 
 
     Silver’s price rose steadily from 2003 until 2008. In 2004 and 2005, its 
proportionate increase was the largest of the main precious metals; and in 2006, it hit 
a 25-year high, the average annual price increasing by over 50% year-on-year.  An 
important element of 2006 was the introduction of exchange traded funds (ETFs) in 
silver in early April.10 In 2007, prices again performed strongly, the annual average 
                                                          
10 ETFs are investment funds that are traded on an exchange by participants who are authorized by 
agreement with the particular ETF distributors. They generally hold assets such as stocks, commodities 
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rising over 15% to a 27-year high of $13.38/oz.  In 2008 - the year the financial crisis 
came to a head – the spot price had initially risen to a (London) high of $20.92 in 
March but then dropped to a low of under $9 in October, a pattern that, at least on the 
surface, was followed by the other precious metals and some other commodities.  In 
spite of the spot price drop, the annual average price in 2008 was still the highest it 
had been in nominal terms since the 1980’s.  It declined, however, for the first time in 
eight years in 2009, though only by around 2%.  This figure, however, was largely a 
result of the highs reached in early 2008 and the slow start in 2009, and masks the 
rally from a low in mid-January of around $10.50 to a 17-month (London) high of 
$19.18 in early December 2009. Silver also recorded a large intra-year gain in 2010 
and a rally from September 2010 took the price to a 30-year high on December 30th 
in London of $30.70.  Gold, in contrast, managed a weaker (though still substantial) 
around 25% rise in its average annual price in 2010. In 2011, the rise in silver was 
dramatic: the London silver fix on April 28th posted a high of $48.70, just shy of the 
all-time nominal high of $49.95 seen in January 1980. Silver outperformed all 
precious metals in 2011 in a rising precious metals market: palladium posted a near 
40% gain; gold was up just under 30%, although platinum’s rise, of only just over 5%, 
was more modest.  In 2012, silver retreated from the highs reached during 2011. This 
decline contrasted with gold, which rose by over 5% to reach a fresh nominal high. 
 
2.3. Platinum 
 
     In January 2001, platinum reached its highest level for almost 14 years at around 
$645/oz but fell back during the year to reach a low of just over $400 in October 
before rallying for the remainder of the year.  In 2002, successive rallies led to the 
price increasing by around $150 to the $600 mark. This rise intensified in 2003 with 
the price reaching a high of just under $850 in December.  Platinum rose in early 2004 
but then traded sideways, before resuming its rise in the second half of 2005 to a 25-
year (London) high of $1,012 in December. Similar patterns were seen in other metals 
markets, with gold, copper, zinc and aluminium all rising to multi-year peaks. The 
platinum price was volatile during some months in 2006, especially May and 
November, alternating with periods of relative calm, before climbing early in 2007.  It 
remained at such levels until September when its price rose sharply higher, reaching a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
or bonds, and can be bought or sold at the end of each day for their net asset value but can trade above 
or below this value throughout the day. 
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new record of $1,544 in December.  Over the year, it gained around 35% on its 2006 
value.  Platinum prices in 2008, the year of the financial crisis, moved dramatically, 
continuing their 2007 advance from an opening fix of $1,530 to an all-time high of 
$2,276 in March and then fell heavily in the second-half of the year to end at around 
$900, a level not seen since 2005. Platinum performed strongly again in 2009, rising 
over 50% from its opening fix to end near its peak of around $1,500 in December.  In 
2010, it gained over 15%, the rise from September reflecting a gold-led rise in prices 
across the whole precious metals complex.  Until the following September, it largely 
traded between $1,700 and $1,900 before beginning a decline that saw it lose more 
than a fifth of its value in 2011 overall.  In 2012, after opening at just over $1,400, it 
again reached over $1,700 by late February, but soon returned to around its opening 
level and was relatively subdued for the rest of the year, save for a brief rise back to 
$1,700 in early October (coinciding with labour disruption in South Africa).  The 
price rose to this level again in February 2013 before falling back with gold around 
June, recovering slightly later in the year.    
 
2.4. Palladium 
 
     Palladium prices rose appreciably in the second half of the 1990’s, reaching a 
record (London) fix of $1,094/oz at the beginning of the sample period, in January 
2000.  The price slumped to $315 in October before beginning to rally again, although 
prices remained weak in 2002.  Palladium, in contrast to platinum, remained subdued 
in 2003 and 2004.  It broadly followed the direction of the other precious metals in 
2005, trading within a narrow range for most of the year, followed by a strong rally at 
the end.  It outperformed platinum in 2006 and kept pace with it in the first half of 
2007.  In the year of the financial crisis 2008, palladium prices were volatile, like the 
prices of the other precious metals, beginning the year at $370 and in line with gold 
and platinum prices climbed to $588 in March, its highest point since 2001, before 
falling to end the year at around half of its value at the beginning.  In 2009, palladium 
was buoyant around the time of gold’s rise to record levels and over the year more 
than doubled in price to achieve a final fix of just over $400.  Palladium was the star 
performer of the precious metals complex in 2010, doubling again in price between 
the year’s opening and closing fixes.  It followed the price of gold on an upward trend 
for most of the year, and appreciated considerably against platinum.  It traded at ten-
year highs for several months in 2011 but shed about 20% of its value over the course 
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of the year. It traded in a relatively narrow range in 2012, beginning at just over $650, 
rising to over $720 in February before ending the year at just under $700.  It was 
initially firmer in 2011 before dropping in April.  Over the final six months of the 
year, platinum traded in a range between $680 and $760. 
     While our main interest is in the spot and front-month futures nominal prices, 
which represent actual market outcomes, we also report exchange-rate adjusted prices 
and inflation-adjusted prices, which add to our evidence base in a way that aids the 
robust interpretation of our results. Figure 1B graphs front-month futures nominal 
prices, Figure 1C front-month SDR-prices and Figure 1D front-month U.S.-PPI 
deflated prices during the 2000-2013 sample period.  
[Figures 1B–1D around here] 
The standard application of PWY/PSY-type tests is predicated on an assumption of 
constant volatility across regimes. Harvey et al. (2016) showed that the PWY test may 
over-declare mildly explosive periods in the presence of non-stationary volatility. To 
assess informally whether this might be a feature of our data, we plot the first 
differenced series for each metal. 
[Figures 2A-2D around here] 
The graphs offer some evidence that volatility in prices increased in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, especially in gold, silver and platinum. Alongside our standard test 
results, we therefore report some results using (higher) data-based critical values 
based on applying the wild bootstrap, whose validity and efficacy Harvey et al. (2016) 
demonstrate in the context of the PWY test. Given the similarity in structure between 
the PWY and PSY tests, Harvey et al. argued that the validity of applying the wild 
bootstrap is likely to carry over to the PSY test, but this has still to be demonstrated. 
Like Etienne et al. (2014, 2015), we therefore apply the wild bootstrap of the PSY test 
without formal justification. 
 
3. The PSY mildly explosive/bubble-testing methodology 
     The PSY (2015a&b) methodology represents the development of a statistically 
rigorous procedure based on a test for temporary regime shifts of exuberance and 
collapse that are embedded in a time series evolving as a stochastic trend.  Built upon 
the theoretical contribution by Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a&b), the test is based 
on a notion of a mildly explosive process that facilitates constructing appropriate 
distribution theory in autoregressive (AR) models whose AR parameter is locally 
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above unity. The sequential nature of the test makes it robust to periodically 
collapsing bubbles (see especially PWY, 2011). 
    The procedure is based on three steps: 
 testing the null hypothesis that there are no mildly explosive periods in the 
sample against the alternative that there is at least one such period; 
 if the test rejects, date-stamping the mildly explosive period(s) in the sample; 
 setting the results in the context of a rational asset pricing model and using 
fundamentals proxy variables to assess whether or not detected periods of mild 
explosivity are consistent with departures from the metal’s fundamental value 
 
      Starting from a fraction 1r  and ending at a fraction 2r  of the total sample, with 
window size 12 rrrw  , we fit, as in conventional (left-sided) augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests, the regression model 
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where k is the lag order chosen on sub-samples using the BIC (information criterion), 
and t  ~ i.i.d. (0, 2, 21 rr ).  The number of observations in the regression is  ww rTT   
and we denote the ADF-statistic (t-ratio) of the coefficient of 1tx  based on this 
regression by 2
1
r
rADF . 
     PSY (2015a&b) introduce two statistics, the backward sup ADF (BSADF) statistic 
and the generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test. They are defined as: 
}{sup)( 2
1]02,0[102
r
rrrrr ADFrBSADF  .      (2) 
)}({sup)( 0]1,[0 202 rBSADFrGSADF rrr  ,     (3) 
where the endpoint of the sample is fixed at 2r  and the window size is allowed to 
expand from an initial fraction 0r  of the total sample to 2r . PSY (2015a) propose 0r  
be chosen to minimize size distortion, according to the rule Tr 8.101.00  , 
where T is the sample size.11 This procedure defines a particular BSADF statistic.   
The GSADF statistic is then constructed through repeated implementation of the 
BSADF procedure for each ]1,[ 02 rr  . Critical values are obtained by simulation. 
                                                          
11 Based on earlier versions of the tests, the results by Zhao et al. (2015) and Long et al. (2016) are 
based on a different initial fraction.    
 
16 
 
PSY (2015a&b) provide limiting distribution theory and small sample simulation 
evidence. 
     The null test of no mildly explosive periods is based on the GSADF statistic. Date-
stamping mildly explosive periods is achieved through the BSADF statistic: the 
origination and termination points of a first bubble, er ,1  and fr ,1 , are estimated, subject 
to a minimum duration condition, by 
 Trrrre scvrBSADFrr 2202 )(:infˆ 02]1,[,1   ,      (4) 
 T
e rrTTrrf
scvrBSADFrr  222 )(:infˆ 02]1,/)log(ˆ[,1   ,     (5) 
where Trscv

2
 is the 100(1 – T )% right-sided critical value of the BSADF statistic 
based on  2rT  observations and δ is a tuning parameter that can be chosen, in 
principle, on basis of sampling frequency. A tuning parameter of unity implies a 
minimum duration condition of log(T) observations.  A mildly explosive period is 
declared if and when the BSADF statistic has been above its critical value for at least 
   )log(ˆ ,1 TrT e   observations. Conditional on a first mildly explosive period having 
been found and estimated to have terminated at fr ,1ˆ , the procedure is then repeated in 
search of a second and possibly subsequent periods.  PSY (2015b) show that, subject 
to rate conditions, the sequential procedure provides consistent estimates of the 
origination and termination dates of one, two and three (and, in principle, more) 
bubbles. 
     The data generation process (DGP) under the alternative hypothesis exhibits K 
bubble episodes in the sample period, represented in terms of sample fraction intervals 
],[ ,, fieiiB   (i = 1, 2 , . . . , K), within periods of prevailing martingale-type 
behavior in the intervals ],1[ ,10 eN  , ],[ ,,1 ejfjjN    (j = 1, 2 , . . . , K – 1) and 
],[ , TN fKK  , as follows:  
)(1)()(1)( 101 ittTttt BtxNtxx        
    )(1
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Ntx
fi
          (t = 1, . . . , T)     (6) 
 TcT /1  ,   c > 0,  )1,0( .                   (7) 
Bubble implosion is modelled, for each i, by   ixxx eifi ,,  , where )1(pi Ox  . This 
entails an abrupt collapse to the value of the last pre-bubble observation plus an )1(pO  
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perturbation, representing a re-intialization of the process from which it resumes its 
trend. In developing work, Phillips and Shi (2014) and Harvey et al. (2016) have 
modelled bubble implosion in a way that is less abrupt than PSY (2015a), using a 
specification proposed by Harvey et al. (2015). 
     Harvey et al. (2016) demonstrate that the PWY test is over-sized when its 
assumption of constant volatility is maintained when the true processes exhibit 
permanent volatility shifts. As noted, Figures 2A-2D suggest this is the case for 
precious metals prices given the apparent rise in volatility after the highpoint of the 
financial crisis. Their proposed alternative, wild-bootstrap implementation of the 
PWY test by design embodies the structure of the volatility in the actual data.  
Applied in the context of the PSY test, this entails (cf. Etienne et al. 2014, p. 135): 
1.  For each data set, estimating the model (1) under the null hypothesis of no       
mildly explosive period, i.e. with the restriction 0
21,
rr  imposed.  Denote 
the residuals by tˆ  and the estimated coefficients by  21 ,ˆ rr . 
2.  Generating wild bootstrap residuals tˆ * such that tˆ * ttˆ , where t  is 
(standardly in context) a sequence of independent N(0, 1) random variables. 
3.   Generating recursive bootstrap samples tx * using 
tx * 1 tx * *ˆ
1
, 21 it
k
i
i
rr x 

    +  tˆ *     (t = 1, . . . , T) . 
4.  Calculating BSADF values on the bootstrap sample using (1) for every 
endpoint for some minimum window size. 
5.  Repeating steps 1-4 a number of times to build up an approximation to the 
distribution of the BSADF statistic. We use 5,000 replications, the same 
number as PSY(2015a) used in the standard case (even although the current 
procedure is far more computationally costly). 
 
     Harvey et al. do not proceed to the second stage of date-stamping mildly explosive 
episodes but it is notable that higher, bootstrap-adjusted critical values can lead to a 
reduction in the number of explosive periods compared with the standard 
implementation of the test because the test becomes more stringent, or an increase in 
number of such periods if an identified long bubble in the standard implementation 
splits up into two or more shorter ones. 
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     The third and final element of the PSY procedure assesses whether the detected 
mildly explosive periods are bubbles.  The test procedure can be interpreted as a test 
for (rational) bubbles under the standard rational asset pricing equation 
tititt
i
i f
t BUDEr
P 



 


 )(1 10 ,                 (8) 
where tP  is the (present-value) price of an asset, tD  is the payoff received from the 
asset, tU  represents unobservable fundamentals, and fr  is the (positive) risk-free 
interest rate (see PSY, 2015a, Section 2). The quantity )( tt BP   is called the market 
fundamental, and the bubble component, tB , is assumed to satisfy the property 
tftt BrBE )1()( 1  ,                   (9) 
which is explosive, given 0fr .  In Section 5, fundamental proxy variables are used 
to assess whether the degree of non-stationarity in tP  is greater than the degree of 
non-stationarity in the fundamental; if so, the mildly explosive period is declared by 
the PSY procedure to be a bubble. 
     Our use of weekly data in our application of the PSY test to precious metals 
potentially impacts upon on the efficacy of the test; for while PSY (2015a&b) set the 
tuning parameter to unity in a context where only one sampling frequency was 
considered, their main empirical applications involved mainly monthly data. As is 
common in commodity and financial market applications, we use higher-frequency 
(weekly) data, not least to enable us to test for bubbles that in context are plausibly 
shorter than would be detectable using monthly data. This might suggest that, if unity 
really were the appropriate value for the tuning parameter for monthly data, we should 
use a higher value for weekly data. The optimal choice of tuning parameter (on the 
basis of sampling frequency) is currently the subject of ongoing work by the second 
author; here we simply follow Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) and confer some 
robustness on our approach by reporting results using higher values of the tuning 
parameter alongside unity. 
     To maintain compatibility with the rational bubbles model, we follow PWY and 
PSY in analyzing price changes and not price returns, and only date-stamp positive 
bubbles. Price returns would entail using the logarithms of prices instead of the levels, 
and in such a context an explosive process would be reflected in a non-zero intercept, 
not in the autoregressive coefficient. 
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4. Test Results 
     The GSADF statistic tests in the direction of at least one episode of mildly 
explosive behaviour in the sample. Tables 1A-1C give eight GSADF statistics 
corresponding to the spot and front-month futures price series for each of the precious 
metals. Table 1A reports results for nominal prices, Table 1B for SDR-adjusted prices 
and Table 1C for U.S. PPI-deflated prices. Critical values are generated for the given 
sample size and rule-based value of r0, and for the standard application of the PSY 
test are the same across each metal. Because the wild bootstrap adjusts critical values 
on the basis of the data, the critical values for the volatility-adjusted application of the 
test are metal specific. 
 [Tables 1A-1D around here] 
     In every case, the GSADF statistic rejects the hypothesis of no mildly explosive 
periods in 2000-2013 for all the precious metals (gold, silver, platinum and palladium) 
at the 1% significance level. With such corroboratory evidence for mildly explosive 
periods, we then move to the second, date-stamping stage of the PSY procedure using 
the BSADF statistic, noting that because of the imposition of a minimum duration 
condition, it is possible that no explosive period is actually dated here. In Tables 2A-
2C, we list the number of mildly explosive periods for the spot and one-month futures 
nominal prices and the two adjusted series for each metal, at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. Table 2D displays the same for front-month futures nominal 
prices for each metal, with critical values adjusted by the application of the wild 
bootstrap.  As noted above, lower significance levels (cf. higher bootstrap-adjusted 
critical values) may lead to fewer bubbles being declared because the test becomes 
more stringent than in the standard case, but potentially more bubbles may be 
declared because long bubbles may split into shorter bubbles. For this reason, in what 
follows we place more weight on the mildly explosive episodes that are actually date-
stamped by the PSY procedure. 
[Tables 2A-2D around here] 
In the first block of each table, we have reported all the excesses of the BSADF 
statistic over its critical value without imposing a minimum duration condition.  This 
information is useful in a context where we are using different values of the tuning 
parameter to measure the amount of “froth” that imposing a minimum duration 
condition dispenses with. Following Yiu et al. (2013) and others, we also report the 
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incidence of both explosive and implosive periods even given the abrupt collapse 
embodied in the specification (9) because, although outside the scope of this paper, 
the PSY procedure can have some efficacy under different models of bubble 
implosion (see Phillips and Shi, 2014).  In all four cases, a large number of mildly 
explosive periods are identified.  When we move to the second block in each table, we 
see the results given by the standard application of the PSY test, with tuning 
parameter set to unity, give smaller numbers of detected explosive periods.  Here, 
important differences emerge among the four metals.  
[Tables 3A-3D around here] 
The spot and front-month futures nominal prices show a small number of short (two 
or three month) mildly explosive episodes in all four metals.  Indeed, looking at Table 
3A, which date-stamps the mildly explosive periods on the basis of the BSADF 
sequences, we see there is a period in gold in the second quarter of 2006, in the run-up 
to the financial crisis in 2008 and in two periods in 2011; in silver during the same 
period in 2006 as in gold, in 2011 again as in gold, but not in the immediate run-up to 
the crisis; and in platinum briefly in 2006, and, as in gold, in the run-up to the crisis. 
Palladium showed mild explosivity in two periods after the crisis, in the spot price 
only. In the SDR-adjusted prices, similar results are found for gold, silver and 
palladium, but no mildly explosive episodes are reported for platinum.  The mildly 
explosive periods in gold spot prices are slightly shorter around 2007-08 than were 
identified by Zhao et al. (2015) and Long et al. (2016) on the basis of the earlier 
version of the PSY test and, more significantly, a later period (or two adjacent shorter 
periods for nominal prices) of price exuberance is declared here only in 2011. 
Inspection of the raw weekly gold spot price series in Figure 1A indicates that there 
were dips in the price in 2011 that led to the termination of the declared mildly 
explosive period. It is also possible, however, that our shorter data span means that the 
responsiveness of the PSY test to a run-up in prices following a collapse is more 
sluggish than for longer data spans and that the efficacy of the date-stamping 
procedure here needs to be better informed by a more detailed study of PSY test 
properties.   
     For the deflated prices, the situation is significantly different.  Here, much more 
froth has been removed against the case where no minimum duration condition is 
imposed, and only one explosive period is detected in the spot and front-month 
futures prices in only silver and palladium.  A conclusion of there being few or no 
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bubbles is reinforced by the results using nominal prices with bootstrap-adjusted 
critical values where mildly explosive periods are detected under the standard 
duration condition only in silver in 2004 and platinum in early 2008. 
[Figures 3A-3D around here] 
Figures 3A-3D plot the BSADF test statistic sequences and the associated 5% critical 
value sequence for the one-month futures nominal prices. The figures also show (in 
feint) the time path of the price series. During periods of rapidly rising prices, the 
BSADF statistic and the price tend to rise together but this co-movement stops if the 
price falls back even if only temporarily.12  For comparison, Figures 4A and 4B show 
the same for the deflated one-month prices for gold and silver.    
[Figures 4A and 4B around here] 
A question arises as to why a mildly explosive period was declared in silver in 2004 
using bootstrap-adjusted critical values and not in the standard case when the critical 
value should have been lower. Figure 5A shows the computed bootstrap-adjusted 
critical value sequences based on 5,000 replications – the same as used by PSY 
(2015a) in the standard case – to highlight how potentially unsmooth the generated 
sequence can be.  In the early period, the computed critical value sequence is actually 
marginally below the sequence in the standard case and this is enough for a mildly 
explosive period to be declared.  In the sequel we therefore discount this finding for 
silver as being a facet of critical value generation and simply note that choosing an 
optimal number of replications in what is a highly computationally demanding 
procedure is a topic for future research.  For comparison, the platinum critical value 
sequences displayed in Figure 5B are much smoother, reflecting that platinum prices 
exhibited fewer shifts in volatility than did silver prices during the sample period. 
 [Figures 5A and 5B around here] 
     As discussed above, a consequence of using weekly data in a context of a 
minimum duration condition that may be more appropriate for monthly data might 
mean that too much froth gets reported as evidence of a structural shift in the data.  
We therefore also report estimates based on a minimum duration condition of 13 
weeks (or one quarter) and 26 weeks (or a half-year), which is facilitated by changes 
in the tuning parameter.  The results here show a dramatic reduction in the number of 
declared mildly explosive periods. Under the 13-week condition, mildly explosive 
                                                          
12 Charts for the corresponding spot prices are similar but are omitted to conserve space. 
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periods are still identified for all the metals at the 10% significance level. At the 5% 
level, however, for gold nominal prices only two periods are now identified, one in 
the run-up to the financial crisis and another in 2011; though for platinum the original 
periods are still reported, including the one in the run-up to the financial crisis. The 
periods for silver and palladium reported in the standard case are now not detected. 
For the SDR-adjusted prices, at the 5% level there are only reported explosive periods 
in gold and for the deflated prices only one instance of an explosive period is reported 
at the 10% significance level, in the palladium spot price, also reported at the 5% 
level.  Under the minimum duration condition of half-a-year, no mildly explosive 
periods are reported at the 5% level for any price series, whether nominal or adjusted.  
Here, the results are similar to those obtained by Etienne et al. (2014, 2015) for 
agricultural commodities and Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) for non-ferrous metals.  
The results taken at face value would indicate that there are no long bubbles. 
However, any dip in the BSADF sequence excess, say as a result of profit taking or a 
brief market correction, could mean that no long mildly explosive period would be 
declared even if such a dip were relatively short-lived.  The issues of the impact of the 
minimum length condition and the general issues of size distortion and temporal 
aggregation are currently the subject of ongoing work but, in the absence of hard 
results in this area, it is worth noting that if there really were contextually a long 
bubble with a short-lived dip within it, it could manifest itself in the PSY framework 
through the detection period being split into shorter bubble periods.  Such behaviour 
might be reflected in gold and silver nominal prices in 2011. 
 
5. Fundamentals and speculation 
     The third stage of the PSY procedure formally sets the test in the context of the 
rational asset pricing model (8) to enable an assessment of whether the detected 
mildly explosive regions are bubbles. This relies on the availability of suitable data 
upon which to construct fundamentals proxy variables. As discussed earlier, this is not 
entirely straightforward for commodities on account of the desirability of using 
relatively high frequency data at the bubbles-dating stage, with the data for many 
natural proxies being available only monthly or even quarterly. And, as we shall show 
by example, analogues of proxy variables that work well in seemingly related contexts 
do not necessarily work well in commodity markets.  For these reasons, we need to 
consider a wider evidence base to discuss precious metals than just one natural 
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fundamental as was the case in PWY’s (2011) study of NASDAQ stock prices using 
dividend yield. 
     We shall initially take the results obtained under the standard application of the 
PSY test with a 7-week minimum duration condition at face value, and assess whether 
as a whole they points towards any behaviour that is non-fundamentals-based.  The 
main detected mildly explosive periods were in the first quarter of 2006 in platinum 
followed by gold and silver in the second quarter; the run-up to the financial crisis in 
2008 in gold and platinum; two instances in the palladium spot price only, from 
around the end of the year in 2009 and 2010 for two or three months; and for periods 
in 2011 in gold and silver.  The evidence using SDR-adjusted prices is broadly similar 
but only the silver explosive period in 2006 and palladium, both spot and one-month 
futures towards the ends of 2009 and 2010 are detected using deflated prices.  The 
evidence under the application of the wild-bootstrap-adjusted critical values and under 
the more stringent duration conditions points to significantly fewer mildly explosive 
episodes and therefore fewer departures from trend, supporting a conclusion that, 
while the precious markets were certainly frothy, the evidence for actual bubbles in or 
around the financial crisis is in fact quite weak. 
 
5.1. Convenience yield 
The formal counterpart in storable commodities markets of the dividend yield in 
equity markets is the convenience yield, which is the implied value of any benefits, 
net of insurance, deterioration and storage costs, that accrue from holding inventories 
of the commodity (see, e.g. Pindyck, 1993). Convenience yield may be interpreted as 
the premium stockholders will pay for immediate access to inventory of known 
specification and location.  Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) explain in the context of 
non-ferrous metals that using convenience yield as a measure of fundamental value 
can be problematic in the PWY/PSY methodology, where the statistical test is based 
on the ratio of the nominal price and fundamental proxy variable.  We now show this 
same argument is relevant to precious metals, perhaps even more so. The convenience 
yield arises as the residual in a cost of carry relationship that links the spot price with 
deferred prices.13 Given that this relationship is based on arbitrage considerations, 
there is no reason to suppose a departure of price from fundamental value would 
                                                          
13 See Miltersen and Schwartz (1998). The cost of carry, or carrying charge, is the cost of storing the 
physical commodity over a period of time. 
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disrupt it.  If it were disrupted, we would expect periods of explosive prices to be 
common to both the spot and futures prices but absent from the convenience yield. If, 
instead, the explosion arises from the convenience yield process itself, say because of 
a pending limitation to the supply of storage, this should be transmitted to either or 
both the spot and futures prices. For this reason, we considered both the spot and 
futures prices in our analysis and treat convenience yield as a candidate 
fundamental.14  For practical reasons we use a standard approximation to convenience 
yield – the interest-adjusted basis – that does not include warehousing costs. 
Specifically, if tS  and tF  are respectively the spot price and one-month futures price 
at time t, we approximate the convenience yield by  
   
t
ttt
tapprox S
FSrcy  )1(,                     (10) 
where tr  is the one-month rate of interest expressed at an annual rate. We use the 
weekly one-month U.S. dollar Intercontinental Exchange London Interbank Offered 
Rate (ICE LIBOR) as the rate of interest for the 2000-13 period.15 
     The final column of Table 1A reports the GSADF statistics for the four 
convenience yield series. All four statistics are negative, and so the null hypothesis of 
no mildly explosive period is not rejected. Taken at face value, this suggests any 
identified explosive periods common to both the spot and futures prices of a given 
metal are absent from the convenience yield, implying that any explosive property 
arises out of the price and not the convenience yield process. We draw the conclusion 
that either explosive prices had the effect of leading to a departure of prices from 
fundamental values, or that convenience yield is not a satisfactory measure of 
fundamental value in precious metals markets when using the PSY test. Given the 
negative values found on the basis of (10) for all four precious metals, we argue for 
the latter, for the same reasons as given by Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015). Indeed the 
argument pertaining to precious metals may even be stronger than for non-ferrous 
                                                          
14 This position implicitly considers convenience yield as a derived process. A referee pointed out that 
there is a significant, even prevalent, view in the commodities literature that would see spot prices and 
convenience yield modelled in a way that the former is explicitly made more persistent than the latter. 
Under this viewpoint, the potential role for convenience yield within a bubbles-testing framework 
would be diminished. Recent empirical evidence consistent with this view is given by Gospodinov and 
Ng (2013).  
15 This is the average of the interest rates that certain of the world’s leading banks charge each other for 
short-term loans. ICE is the parent company of the New York Stock Exchange and around two dozen 
other exchanges and markets around the world. It took over the administration of LIBOR from the 
British Bankers Association in early 2014. 
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metals. It is normal for a non-perishable commodity that has a cost of carry to be in 
contango, meaning that the futures price is higher than the expected spot price owing 
to the willingness of agents to pay a premium to have the commodity in the future, 
rather than paying the costs of storage and carrying cost arising from buying the 
commodity today. This would mean (10) taking on negative values.16  Precious 
metals, with their investment asset role, differ from non-ferrous metals, which 
themselves differ from, say, crude oil, in the extent to which the commodity is 
storable and available. The crude oil market is often in backwardation, meaning that 
the futures contract trades below the expected spot price, for little oil is stored in 
comparison with the quantity of physical oil demanded. The negative values of 
measured convenience yields we find for previous metals not only make the ratio 
between the commodity price and the convenience yield proxy unusable as a basis for 
testing for mild explosivity using the PSY approach; they also damage the efficacy of 
the approach applied directly to the approximate convenience yield process itself. 
 
5.2. Gold lease rates 
 
     Lucey and O’Connor (2013) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2014) have argued that lease 
rates – the interest that can be earned by lending the physical metal at various 
maturities – are potentially a more effective measure of fundamental value than 
convenience yield or its interest-adjusted basis proxy used above. In practice, lease 
rates exist because central banks hold quantities of gold that they may lease out for a 
return.  Given that today central banks predominantly hold only gold, we only report 
results obtained using gold lease rates, here the annualized over-the-counter (OTC) 
interest rates that can be earned by lending gold over 1, 2, 3, 6, or 12 months.  On the 
basis of a Markov switching approach, Lucey and O’Connor (2013) found evidence 
for mildly explosive episodes only in cases where a constant variance was imposed 
across regimes, specifically for the 2, 3 and 12 month lease rates, but not for the 1 and 
6 month rates. 
[Table 1D about here] 
Table 1D shows that using the PSY test, all the GSADF statistics are above the 
critical value at the 1% significance level indicating that the hypothesis of no mildly 
explosive period is rejected.  The BSADF sequence for each lease rate fails, however, 
to date a mildly explosive period.  While there is strong evidence to suggest there 
                                                          
16 Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2012) also reported measured convenience yields that were negative. 
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were one or more spikes in the lease rates, they were not of sufficient duration for a 
mildly explosive period to be detected under the PSY procedure. The one-month gold 
lease rate BSADF sequence is displayed in Figure 6 as an exemplar. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
Here, a short spike is notable in the midst of the crisis in 2008. At the 5% significance 
level, this would only offer statistical evidence that the early-2008 rise in gold lease 
rates in the run-up to the high point of the crisis was a bubble if a shorter minimum 
duration condition were imposed. To do so would be to take a position against the 
evidence that the period of exuberance in gold prices around this time in fact lasted 
for a few months. Computing bootstrap-adjusted critical values to take account of 
non-stationary volatility in gold lease rate data would only reinforce the conclusion 
that there are no mildly explosive periods in gold lease prices, with the implication 
that, if lease rates have efficacy as representing the fundamental value of gold, as 
Lucey and O’Connor (2013) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2014) have suggested, the 
mildly explosive period in gold prices in early-2008 was not reflected in the 
fundamental and would therefore be a bubble that could be a result of non-
fundamentals-based speculation. 
 
5.3. Supply and demand fundamentals 
     A full treatment of supply and demand fundamentals in and around the 2007-08 
financial crisis would represent a considerable undertaking beyond the scope of the 
current paper, and so we continue to restrict ourselves to the topic in hand, which is to 
assess through the lens of the crisis whether the evidence points towards any detected 
mildly explosive periods are fundamentals-based or speculatively driven.  We only 
focus on the platinum and gold episodes in 2008, and the silver and gold episodes in 
2011. While in early 2008 platinum was subject to the same macroeconomic 
environment as gold, including a depreciating dollar, its price may have been 
significantly bolstered by the decision of Eskom, a South African electricity company, 
in January 2008 to introduce “load shedding”, namely intentional rolling blackouts of 
electricity power distribution during periods where short supply threatens the integrity 
of an electricity grid.  In January and February mines were first shut down and then 
restricted in their electricity use, and during this period platinum and palladium 
reached record highs.  The evidence would therefore seem to point to the mildly 
explosive period in platinum – which was the only mildly explosive period identified 
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in nominal prices when using bootstrap-adjusted critical values – being caused by 
actual and anticipated supply shortages, rather than being a speculatively-driven 
bubble.  Given that South Africa was then supplying as much as 85% of the world’s 
platinum production but only around 30% of its palladium might explain why the 
bubble manifested itself only in platinum even although the effect of the Eskom 
power shortages was common to both. 
     Our discussion in this section of plausible gold price fundamentals in 2008 
considers not just the run-up in prices but also the collapse in the price and its 
aftermath, with a view to gaining some insight into why the gold price might have 
fallen from around the supposed high point of the crisis given gold’s supposed safe 
haven status. In Section 2, we noted there were four gold price spikes, in March, July, 
September and December, reflecting the high volatility in the market as the crisis 
unfolded.  Dollar weakness in the first half of the year until July may have intensified 
the general run-up in commodity prices seen particularly in energy and grains around 
this time. The rise in the price of oil is likely to have been significant influence; 
indeed the oil price hit a record high in July at almost the same time that the dollar 
dropped to a record low against the Euro. Closer inspection of the wider data, 
however, reveals that the dollar traded essentially sideways through much of January 
and February, during the time the mildly explosive episode was detected. Instead, we 
point to net investment in gold, particularly in the OTC market, and bar hoarding, 
particularly in East Asia and the Middle East, as having been potentially significant 
fundamental factors that can be associated with price movements.  Unfortunately, we 
report only the available annual data, but the GFMS Gold Survey (2009), alongside 
reporting a rise of 52% in gold investment in 2008, notes “tremendous” levels of 
speculative inflows during the first quarter, then liquidation through to the third 
quarter, followed again by investment in the final quarter. The Survey also reports a 
62% year-on-year rise in bar hoarding, with Chinese holdings notably rising more 
than threefold from under 20 tonnes to just over 60 tonnes. 
[Table 4 about here] 
     Large, speculative inflows at the same time as the detected mildly explosive period 
in gold would point to there having been a quarter-long speculatively-driven bubble in 
gold in early 2008; and indeed this was the only mildly explosive period in any metal 
detected using SDR-adjusted prices (which adjust for changing exchange rates) using 
a minimum duration condition longer than for the standard PSY test. The evidence 
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that investment demand in gold then fell sharply, just after the highpoint of the crisis, 
would support a hypothesis of positions being unwound to facilitate margin calls 
being met in more traditional financial assets,17 with the later investment implying a 
resumption in gold’s safe haven status once feasible. The strong investment demand 
recorded into 2009, in both physical gold and ETFs, adds weight to this assertion. 
     Finally, we consider supply and demand fundamentals evidence around the time of 
the detected mildly explosive periods in gold and silver in 2011. There was only a 
modest increase in mine production of gold and a small fall in scrap supply. On the 
demand side, world investment in gold dropped by 10%; there were heavy 
redemptions in the futures and OTC markets; the demand for ETFs only saw modest 
growth; and fabrication demand grew negligibly. This contrasts with physical bar 
investment in gold which, in 2011, accounted for around three-quarters of world 
investment, compared with around half in 2010, which represents a rise in value of 
over one-third, year-on-year. Indeed, gold bar investment was only a quarter of world 
investment in 2009. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Significantly increased official and non-official purchases of gold were seen in 2011 
in Europe, where holdings rose to a record, and in China and India. Physical bar 
investment may therefore be seen to have represented the major source of world 
demand in 2011 but we hypothesize that the major driver of this demand, in a context 
of more or less fixed supply, stemmed from the macroeconomic and geopolitical 
environment. Price rises from early February correlate with the Arab Spring and 
heightened Middle East tension; in mid-March with an ambiguous FOMC statement 
and the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami; and in April with credit rating agency 
downgrades of Irish and Portuguese debt and concerns over a need for Greece to 
restructure its debt.  The safe-haven view of gold is also supported by a fall in its price 
in June and July, during a period in which the International Energy Agency released 
600 million barrels of stockpiled oil and the Greek government passed austerity cuts,  
and then the subsequent rise in gold’s price in the aftermath of Standard and Poor’s 
debt downgrading.  Unfortunately, monthly data on physical bar holding, that might 
help substantiate a safe-haven hypothesis, is not publicly available. 
                                                          
17 The Silver Institute’s The Silver Market - An Update (2011) also makes this assertion with respect to 
silver (which shares some of gold’s investment characteristics). 
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     The more substantial run-up seen in silver prices in the early part of the year took 
place at a time of increased investment demand in silver.  The Silver Institute’s World 
Silver Survey (2012) reports substantially increased investor activity coinciding 
almost precisely with this period, especially in the OTC market.  This is not, however, 
evident from the available annual figure which indicated an 11% annual fall in 
investment demand even given that “investment was concentrated in the first four 
months of the year” (p. 8).  All in all, the evidence points towards gold and silver 
prices in 2011 having both been influenced by macroeconomic and geopolitical 
events, with the greater rise in silver being attributable to a metal-specific rise in 
investment demand. 
 
5.4. ETF launches in silver and palladium 
 
      In 2006, one potentially important event was the launch of the first silver 
exchange traded fund (ETF), issued by iShares on April 28th, within periods of 
identified mild explosivity in silver and gold in nominal and SDR-adjusted prices, but 
only in silver in the deflated price series. As noted in Section 2, the silver price 
showed a larger proportionate increase than gold during this period. Indeed, the 
explosive period in silver detected in 2006 would be the only genuine mildly 
explosive period in either silver or gold (rather than being simply froth) if the 
application of the PSY test using deflated prices were taken at face value. This finding 
may also be implicit in the results of Harvey et al. (2016) who found the existence of 
at least one explosive period in gold being identified only at the 10% significance 
level but in silver at the 5% level. The beginning of the identified explosive periods in 
silver (and possibly gold) could plausibly be based on the anticipation of a silver ETF 
launch. In general, the launch of an ETF would be expected to affect at least prices 
through increasing net inflows into positions in the physical metal and the over-the-
counter market, especially as some ETFs are physically backed, and this has the 
potential to reduce liquidity in the market and thereby raise prices.  Further, the 
evidence shows silver and gold price both peaked on exactly the same day, May 12th, 
a fortnight after the launch, from which point there was a notable correction in both.  
One plausible explanation is that gold and silver were tied to each other, with silver 
unusually leading gold around the silver ETF launch with a return to normality 
sometime later in May. Two short explosive periods were also detected in the nominal 
spot prices of palladium around beginning of 2010 and 2011, although only the 
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former was declared under PPI-adjusted prices. This result may reflect that the first 
U.S.-based ETF in palladium was launched in January 2010.18 
      
5.5. Non-commercial positions and speculation 
 
      We can provide a direct test for speculative behaviour for each precious metal 
using the Commitments of Traders (CoT) position data published by the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for the COMEX futures market. 
We look specifically at the net level of non-commercial positions on the COMEX 
market, since these are widely interpreted as speculative positions.19  In addition, 
following Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2010), we use Working’s (1960) T-index as a 
measure of “excess speculation”. Write long and short commercial (“hedge”) 
positions as HL and HS and long and short non-commercial (“speculative”) positions 
as SL and SS respectively. The net non-commercial position is N L HS S S  . 
Working’s T-index is then defined by 
   1 11 S L s S L L
L S
H H S H H S
T
H H
                           (11) 
If T = 1, the level of non-commercial activity is just sufficient to be available as 
counterparties for the commercial imbalance. Any excess over unity implies that 
speculators are acting as counterparties for each other. 
     We look for periods of mild explosivity in these two measures of speculative 
activity. 
[Table 1E about here] 
     The GSADF statistics for the net non-commercial positions data do not reject the 
null of no explosive period for gold, silver and platinum at the 10% significance level, 
but reject the hypothesis for palladium at the 1% level. The corresponding BSADF 
sequence dates one explosive episode in the palladium positions data, from May 2002 
                                                          
18 Johnson Matthey’s Platinum Report (2011) reports that net identifiable physical investment demand 
for palladium increased by 74% in 2010 on the back of the demand for several ETFs. This might 
explain why palladium’s prices outperformed those of silver, platinum and gold in this particular year. 
19 Commercial positions are associated with producers and consumers of the commodity. Non-
commercial positions reflect the activities of market participants for investment purposes. A referee has 
pointed out that, because the pre-2006 CoT data were aggregated, the efficacy of this test may be 
limited. Since traders need a counterparty with whom to trade, net commercial positions are necessarily 
offset by net non-commercial positions: the aggregate data is not informative about which traders 
initiated trades with whom. An implicit assumption that the net commercial imbalance is exogenous 
and that non-commercials provide the necessary liquidity is difficult to test, making it difficult to 
unscramble hedging and speculative effects. Also, the increased sophistication of financial transactions 
can make the distinction between commercial and non-commercial traders problematic. See CFTC 
(2006). 
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to November 2002. In terms of the raw series, the palladium price fell markedly in 
2002 with Johnson Matthey’s Platinum Report (2003) reporting that “[R]ussian 
shipments of palladium fell sharply in the weak market but production of the metal in 
all other regions expanded. As a result, the market remained oversupplied . . .” (For 
completeness, we note that the demand for platinum fell by 30% in 2002.)  The excess 
of supply over demand therefore provides a strong fundamentals-based reason as to 
why palladium prices fell in 2002, with the evidence pointing very strongly against 
any increased activity of speculators having been the driver of price movements. The 
question remains as to why the net non-commercial positions data showed a sustained 
mildly explosive period under the PSY test in a context of falling prices. Certainly, 
trading volumes in palladium were generally thin in 2002, reflecting palladium’s 
relative unimportance then as a precious metal, and it could be that any investor 
activity around this time was accentuated.20   
     The GSADF statistic for Woking’s T-index marginally rejects the null of no 
explosive period in gold at the 10% significance level but it is insignificant for the 
other precious metals (including palladium). No explosive period is dated in gold 
from the BSADF sequence. Taken at face value, the direct statistical evidence that 
speculators drove prices away from trend is extremely limited. 
 
6. Conclusion 
     This paper has examined the mildly explosive/bubbles properties of the main 
precious metals – gold, silver, platinum and palladium – in and around the financial 
crisis, in what we believe is the most comprehensive study of such properties in the 
precious metals complex to date. Using the PSY (2015a&b) procedure, which 
supersedes the PWY (2011) procedure used in some earlier studies, we have utilized 
the most up-to-date statistical technology. The mere observation that a time series is 
upward trending does not constitute prima facie evidence for bubble behaviour; for 
such behaviour may simply reflect the realization of a random walk with drift that 
                                                          
20 Christian (2006, pp. 145-146) asserts that loans taken out in the final period of the Soviet Union and 
in the following decade by the Russian government, that had used palladium as collateral, were 
unwound by the Russian government in 2001 following the previous year’s price high, with the 
palladium being used for payment. The European bank in receipt of this palladium, seeing prices 
continuing their fall in 2002, itself began selling its stock, both to industrial users and to hedge funds 
and other institutional investors. While this account might help explain the falling prices and 
simultaneous rise in non-commercial positions, it is not amenable to evidence-based assessment 
because the amount of palladium shipped as collateral from Russia to bonded warehouses in Europe 
remains unknown. 
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could have been generated in the context of an efficient market.  The PSY procedure 
offers a rigorously-grounded statistical test for a departure from trend in the direction 
of mild explosivity, which when set in the context of a rational asset pricing model 
can offer a test for bubble behaviour.  Here, we have used the test’s efficacy to 
demarcate the salient features of the price behaviour of the precious metals in and 
around the financial crisis, as a basis of interpreting their price movements using 
available data and evidence.  Some of this data facilitated further testing based on the 
PSY approach but other potentially relevant data was only available in a form that 
meant some of the evidence could at best be pieced together.  We recognize that the 
approach of Batten et al. (2010), which uses a data-based search among a large 
number of candidate fundamentals variables, has its merits.  Nevertheless, we feel that 
our assessment of the evidence that specifically used the fundamentals proposed in the 
precious metals literature has allowed us, within the scope of this paper, to offer a 
comprehensive description and analysis of the price behaviour of the main precious 
metals in the run-up to, during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  In so doing, 
our paper fills a current gap in the literature. 
     Our general conclusion is that while the precious metals markets were certainly 
frothy, the evidence for there having been bubbles in or around the financial crisis is 
weak and is at best limited to the run-up in the gold price in early-2008 and two short 
episodes in silver and palladium around certain respective ETF launches. The results 
using the wild bootstrap to take account of increased volatility in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis serve to reinforce this conclusion. 
 
References 
Barone-Adesi, G., Geman, H., Theal, J., 2014. On the lease rate, convenience yield 
and speculative effects in the gold futures market. International Journal of 
Financial Engineering and Risk Management 1 (3). 282-307. 
Batten, J.A., Ciner, C., Lucey, B.M., 2010. The macroeconomic determinants of 
volatility in precious metals markets. Resources Policy 35, 65-71. 
Baur, D., Glover, K.J., 2015. Speculative trading in the gold market. International 
Review of Financial Analysis 39, 63-71. 
Bertus, M., Stanhouse, B., 2001. Rational speculative bubbles in the gold futures 
market: an application of dynamic factor analysis. Journal of Futures Markets 
21, 79-108. 
Bialkowski, J., Bohl, M.T., Stephan, P.M., Wisniewski, T.P., 2015. The gold price in 
times of crisis. International Review of Financial Analysis 41, 329-339. 
33 
 
CFTC, 2006.  Commission Actions in Response to the “Comprehensive Review of the 
Commitments of Traders Reporting Program” (June 21, 2006). Washington DC, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  
Christian, J.M., 2006.  Commodities Rising.  John Wiley and Sons. 
Deaton, A.S., Laroque, G., 1996. Competitive storage and commodity price dynamics.  
Journal of Political Economy 104, 896-923. 
Diba, B.T., Grossman, H.I., 1984.  Rational bubbles in the price of gold.  NBER 
Paper No. 1300. 
Diba, B.T., Grossman, H.I., 1988. Explosive rational bubbles in stock prices? 
American Economic Review 78, 520-530. 
Emekter, R., Jirasakuldech, B., Went, P., 2012. Rational speculative bubbles and 
commodities markets: application of the duration dependence test. Applied 
Financial Economics 22, 581-596. 
Etienne, X.L., Irwin, S.H., Garcia, P., 2014 Bubbles in food commodity markets: four 
decades of evidence. Journal of International Money and Finance 42, 129-155. 
Etienne, X.L., Irwin, S.H., Garcia, P., 2015. Price explosiveness, speculation and 
grain futures prices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 97, 65-87. 
Evans, G.W., 1991. Pitfalls in testing for explosive bubbles in asset prices.  American 
Economic Review 81, 922-930. 
Figuerola-Ferretti, I., Gilbert, C.L., and McCrorie, J.R., 2015. Testing for mild 
explosivity and bubbles in LME non-ferrous metals prices. Journal of Time 
Series Analysis 36, 763-782. 
Figuerola-Ferretti, I., and Gonzalo, J., 2010. Modeling and measuring price discovery 
in commodity markets. Journal of Econometrics 158, 95-107. 
Gilbert, C.L., 2010. Speculative influence on commodity prices 2006-08. Discussion 
Paper 197, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
Geneva. 
Gospodinov, N., Ng, S., 2013.  Commodity prices, convenience yields and inflation. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 95(1), 206-219. 
Harvey, D.I., Leybourne, S.J., Sollis, R., 2015. Recursive right-tailed unit root tests 
for an explosive asset price bubble. Journal of Financial Econometrics 13(1), 
166-187. 
Harvey, D.I., Leybourne, S.J., Sollis, R., Taylor, A.M.R., 2016. Tests for explosive 
financial bubbles in the presence of non-stationary volatility. Forthcoming, 
Journal of Empirical Finance (doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.09.002). In press, 
corrected proof available at:  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539815000961 
Homm, U., Breitung, J., 2012. Testing for speculative bubbles in stock markets: a 
comparison of alternative methods. Journal of Financial Econometrics 10 (1), 
198-231. 
Long, W., Li, D., Li, Q., 2016. Testing explosive behavior in the gold market. 
Forthcoming, Empirical Economics (doi: 10.1007/s00181-015-1030-z). First view 
available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-015-1030-z. 
Lucey, B., O’Connor, F.A., 2013. Do bubbles occur in the gold price?  An 
investigation of gold lease dates and Markov switching models. Borsa Istanbul 
Review 13, 53-63. 
Miltersen, K.R., Schwartz, E.S., 1998. Pricing of options on commodity futures  with 
stochastic term structures of convenience yields and interest rates. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33, 33-59.  
 
34 
 
Pindyck, R., 1993. The present value model of rational commodity pricing.  Economic 
Journal 103, 511-530. 
Phillips, P.C.B., Magdalinos, T., 2007a. Limit theory for moderate deviations from 
unity. Journal of Econometrics 136 (1), 115-130. 
___________, 2007b. Limit theory for moderate deviations from unity under weak 
dependence. In Phillips, G.D.A. & E. Tzavalis (Eds.) The Refinement of 
Econometric Estimation and Test Procedures: Finite Sample and Asymptotic 
Analysis.  Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-162. 
Phillips, P.C.B., Shi, S.P., 2014. Financial bubble implosion. Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper No. 1967. 
Phillips, P.C.B., Shi, S.-P., Yu, J., 2012.  Testing for multiple bubbles. Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1843. 
Phillips, P.C.B., Shi, S.-P., Yu, J., 2015a. Testing for multiple bubbles: historical 
episodes of exuberance and collapse in the S&P 500. International Economic 
Review 56 (4), 1043-1077. [PSYa] 
Phillips, P.C.B., Shi, S.-P., Yu, J., 2015b. Testing for multiple bubbles: limit theory of 
real time detectors. International Economic Review 56 (4), 1079-1133. [PSYb] 
Phillips, P.C.B., Wu, Y., Yu, J., 2011. Explosive behavior in the 1990s Nasdaq: when 
did exuberance escalate asset values? International Economic Review 52 (1), 
210-226. [PWY] 
Phillips, P.C.B., Yu, J., 2011. Dating the timeline of financial bubbles during the 
subprime crisis. Quantitative Economics 2 (3), 455-491. [PY] 
Sanders, D.R., Irwin, S.H., Merrin, R.P., 2010. The adequacy of speculation in 
agricultural futures markets: too much of a good thing? Applied Economic 
Perspectives and Policy 32, 77-94. 
Working, H. (1960). Speculation on hedging markets. Food Research Institute Studies 
1, 185-220. 
Yiu, M.S., Yu, J., Lu, J., 2013. Detecting bubbles in Hong Kong residential property.  
Journal of Asian Economics 28, 115-124. 
Zhao, Y., Chang, H.-L., Su, C.-W., Nian, R., 2015.  Gold bubbles: when are they most 
likely to occur? Japan and the World Economy 34-35, 17-23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1B 
GSADF Test Statistics 
SDR‐adjusted Prices 
 Spot Fut. 1m
Gold  4.237 4.298
Silver  5.173  5.097 
Platinum  5.010 4.607
Palladium  4.446  4.225 
The  table  reports  the  generalized  sup ADF  (GSADF)  statistics  for 
the spot and one‐month futures dollar‐adjusted prices of the four 
principal  COMEX  precious metals  estimated  over  the  sample  of 
729 weekly  observations  from  January  2000  to December  2013. 
(Two observations  are  lost  in  lag  creation.)    The  adjusted prices 
were obtained by dividing by  the SDR  index.   The  initial window 
for  recursive  estimation  is  56  weeks.  The  ADF  lag  is  chosen  to 
minimize  the  BIC  over  every  subsample  with  the  maximum  lag 
length  set  at 5 weeks.  Standard PSY  critical  values: 2.069  (10%), 
2.282 (5%) and 2.664 (1%). 
 
 
 
Table 1A 
GSADF test statistics 
Nominal Prices 
 Spot  Fut. 1m  Conv. Yields 
Gold  4.110  3.904  ‐2.810 
Silver  5.670 5.665 ‐1.440 
Platinum  5.591  5.151  ‐2.975 
Palladium  4.624 4.417 ‐1.307 
The  table  reports  the generalized sup ADF  (GSADF) statistics  for  the spot 
and one‐month  futures nominal prices, and the convenience yield, of the 
four principal COMEX precious metals estimated over  the  sample of 729 
weekly  observations  from  January  2000  to  December  2013.  (Two 
observations  are  lost  in  lag  creation.)  The  initial  window  for  recursive 
estimation  is 56 weeks.  The ADF  lag  is  chosen  to minimize  the BIC over 
every  subsample  with  the  maximum  lag  length  set  at  5  weeks.  Critical 
values under standard application of the PSY test: 2.069 (10%), 2.282 (5%) 
and 2.664 (1%). 
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Table 1C
GSADF Test Statistics 
US‐PPI‐Deflated Prices 
 Spot Fut. 1m
Gold  3.609 3.999
Silver  4.039  5.665 
Platinum  5.106 4.653
Palladium  3.840  3.477 
The  table  reports  the  generalized  sup ADF  (GSADF)  statistics  for 
the  spot  and  one‐month  future  deflated  prices  of  the  four 
principal  COMEX  precious metals  estimated  over  the  sample  of 
729 weekly  observations  from  January  2000  to December  2013. 
(Two  observations  are  lost  in  lag  creation.)  Prices  are  deflated 
using the US PPI index. The initial window for recursive estimation 
is 56 weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to minimize the BIC over every 
subsample with the maximum lag length set at 5 weeks. Standard 
PSY critical values: 2.069 (10%), 2.282 (5%) and 2.664 (1%). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1D
GSADF  Test Statistic 
Gold Lease  Rates
Maturity 
(months)  1 2 3 6 12 
GSADF  10.106 7.925 8.094 6.022 6.081 
This  table  reports GSADF  statistics  for Gold  lease  rates  for 
different maturities.  The lease rate at maturity t is derived as 
the  t‐month U.S.  dollar  ICE  LIBOR minus  the  t‐month Gold 
Forward Offered (GOFO) rate. (A GOFO rate is a rate at which 
contributors are prepared to lend gold in a swap against U.S. 
dollars.)  The  initial  window  for  recursive  estimation  is  56 
weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to minimize the BIC over every 
subsample  with  the  maximum  lag  length  set  at  5  weeks. 
Standard  PSY  Critical  values:  2.069  (10%),  2.282  (5%)  and 
2.664 (1%). Although the GSADF statistic is significant, there 
is  no  date‐stamping  for  any  of  the  maturities  using  the 
BSADF  sequence  given  under  application  of  the  standard 
minimum duration condition. 
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Table 1E
GSADF Test Statistics 
CFTC Position Data 
 Net Positions  Working’s T‐index 
Gold  0.438  2.092 
Silver             ‐0.209 ‐0.0154
Platinum  1.784  1.327 
Palladium  5.766  2.176 
This table reports GSADF statistics for the level of speculative 
activity  in  the  COMEX  precious  metals  market  which  we 
employ  in  Section  6  of  the  paper.  Working’s  T‐index  of 
excess  speculation  is  defined  by  equation  (11).    The  initial 
window for recursive estimation  is 56 weeks. The ADF  lag  is 
chosen  to minimize  the BIC over every  subsample with  the 
maximum  lag  length  set  at  5  weeks.  Standard  PSY  critical 
values: 2.069 (10%), 2.282 (5%) and 2.664 (1%).  The GSADF 
statistic for palladium net non‐commercial positions data is 
significant and a mildly explosive period is dated from May 
2002 to November 2002 by the BSADF sequence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A 
Number of Mildly Explosive Periods Identified 
Nominal Prices
Minimum bubble length  1  7 13  26
Minimum bubble calibration  1  1  1  1 
Test size  10%  5%  1%  10% 5%  1%  10% 5%  1%  10% 5%  1% 
Gold  Spot  6+10  5+13  2+3  5+2  4+0  1+1  3+1  2  0+1  1  0  0 
Fut. 1m  9+7  6+12  7+4  4+1  4+1  1  3  1  0  1  0  0 
Silver  Spot  5+7  3+4  3+6  2+2  2+1  2  1  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  6+5  4+4  4+4  3  2+1  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Platinum  Spot  4+4  6+1  5+2  2+1  2+1  1  2  2  1  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  6+2  5+4  3+3  2+1  2  1  2  2  1  0  0  0 
Palladium  Spot  2+9  3+5  1+5  2+2  2+1  1+1  0+1  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  2+8  2+4  2+5 0+2 0+2 0+1 0+1 0+1  0  0  0 0
The table reports the number of mildly explosive periods identified for the spot and one‐month futures prices 
of  the  four principal COMEX precious metals estimated over  the  sample of 729 weekly observations  from 
January 2000 to December 2013. (Two observations are lost in lag creation.)  The initial window for recursive 
estimation is 56 weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to minimize the BIC over every subsample with the maximum 
lag length set at 5 weeks. The minimum bubble length is set at 7 weeks (columns 1 and 2), 13 weeks (column 
3) and 26 weeks (column 4). Critical values are calibrated for 1, 7, 13 and 26 weeks (columns 1‐4 respectively). 
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Table 2B 
Number of Mildly Explosive Periods Identified 
SDR‐adjusted Prices 
Minimum bubble length  1  7 13  26
Minimum bubble calibration  1  1 1 1
Test size  10%  5%  1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5%  1%  10% 5% 1%
Gold  Spot  5+8  3+12 3+3 4+2 3+1 2 3+1 2 0+1  0  0 0Fut. 1m  3+12  2+9  3+2  3+3  3+1  2  3  1  0  1  0  0 
Silver  Spot  3+3  2+5  1+5  2+2  2+1  1+1  1  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  4+3  2+4  2+4  2+2  2+1  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Platinum  Spot  4+2  2+3  1+2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  3+4  2+4  2+2  1+1  1+1  0+1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Palladium  Spot  3+6  3+4  0+7  2+1  2  1  0+1  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  1+7  2+5  1+4  0+2  0+2  0+1  0+1  0  0  0  0  0 
The table reports the number of mildly explosive periods identified for the cash and one‐month futures SDR‐
adjusted  prices  of  the  four  principal  COMEX  precious  metals  estimated  over  the  sample  of  729  weekly 
observations  from  January 2000  to December 2013.  (Two observations are  lost  in  lag creation.)   The  initial 
window for recursive estimation is 56 weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to minimize the BIC over every subsample 
with the maximum lag length set at 5 weeks. The minimum bubble length is set at 7 weeks (columns 1 and 2), 
13  weeks  (column  3)  and  26  weeks  (column  4).  Critical  values  are  calibrated  for  1,  7,  13  and  26  weeks 
(columns 1‐4 respectively). 
Table 2C 
Number of Mildly Explosive Periods Identified 
US‐PPI‐Deflated Prices 
Minimum bubble length  1  7 13  26
Minimum bubble calibration  1  1 1 1
Test size  10%  5%  1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5%  1%  10% 5% 1%
Gold  Spot  1+6  2+2  0+3  0+1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  1+8  1+2  0+2  0+1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Silver  Spot  4+3  2+4  1+3  1+1  1+1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  2+2  2+3  1+3  1+1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Platinum  Spot  4+1  2+2  2+2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  1+5  1+3  1+3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Palladium  Spot  3+5  3+5  1+3  3  1  1+1  1  1  0  0  0  0 Fut. 1m  1+5  1+7  1+2  3+1  1+1  1+1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
The table reports the number of mildly explosive periods  identified for the spot and one‐month futures US‐
PPI‐deflated prices of  the  four principal COMEX precious metals estimated over  the  sample of 729 weekly 
observations  from  January 2000  to December 2013.  (Two observations are  lost  in  lag  creation.) The  initial 
window for recursive estimation is 56 weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to minimize the BIC over every subsample 
with the maximum lag length set at 5 weeks. The minimum bubble length is set at 7 weeks (columns 1 and 2), 
13  weeks  (column  3)  and  26  weeks  (column  4).  Critical  values  are  calibrated  for  1,  7,  13  and  26  weeks 
(columns 1‐4 respectively). 
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Table 2D 
Number of Mildly Explosive Periods Identified using wild‐bootstrap‐adjusted critical values 
Nominal Front‐Month Futures Prices
Minimum bubble length  1  7 
Minimum bubble calibration  1  1 
Test size  10%  5%  1%  10%  5%  1% 
Gold                 8+4  3  2  2+1  0  0 
Silver                 3  4  3+1  2  1  0 
Platinum                 8+9    3+7  1+1  4+1  1  0 
Palladium         5+5     3+4 0+1 0+1  0  0
The table reports the number of mildly explosive periods identified for the one‐month futures nominal prices 
of  the  four principal COMEX precious metals estimated over  the  sample of 729 weekly observations  from 
January 2000 to December 2013 using critical values derived using the wild bootstrap. (Two observations are 
lost  in  lag  creation.)    The  initial  window  for  recursive  estimation  is  56  weeks.  The  ADF  lag  is  chosen  to 
minimize the BIC over every subsample with the maximum  lag  length set at 5 weeks. The minimum bubble 
length is set at 1 weeks (columns 1) and 7 weeks (column 2). 
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Table 3A 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price growth 
Nominal Prices 
Minimum 
bubble length  7 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks 
 Start End Start End Start End 
G
ol
d 
Spot Mar 2006  
Apr 2006 May 2006 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot + Dec 2007 Apr 2008 Dec 2007 Apr 2008 No bubble Fut. 1m  
Spot + Apr 2011 Jun 2011 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot  
 
Fut. 1m 
  Jul 2011 
Dec 2011 
Jul 2011         Dec 2011 No bubble Sep 2011 
Si
lv
er
 Spot + Mar 2006 May 2006 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot + Feb 2011 Apr 2011 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Pl
at
in
um
 Spot  Oct 2005 Feb 2006  Oct 2005  Feb 2006 No bubble Fut. 1m Sep 2005  Sep 2005 
Spot + 
Jan 2008 Apr 2008 Jan 2008 Apr 2008 No bubble Fut. 1m 
Pa
lla
di
um
 Spot Dec 2009 Feb 2010 No bubble No bubble Only 
Spot 
Dec 2010 Mar 2011 No bubble No bubble Only 
This table reports the mildly explosive periods in the nominal prices of the four principal 
COMEX precious metals that are identified using the PSY procedure with a 5% size. Following 
PSY (2015a), critical values are calculated without taking account of the minimum bubble 
length and are therefore the same in each column of the table. 
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Table 3B 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price growth 
SDR-adjusted Prices 
Minimum 
bubble length  7 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks 
 Start End Start End Start End 
G
ol
d 
Spot Mar 2006  
Dec 2005 May 2006 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot + Jan 2008 Mar 2008 Dec 2007 Apr 2008 No bubble  Fut. 1m 
Spot + Jul 2011 Sep 2011 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Si
lv
er
 
Spot + Mar 2006 May 2006 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot + Feb 2011 Apr 2011 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Spot+ Aug 2011 Sep 2011 No bubble No bubble 1m Fut 
Pl
at
in
um
  
Fut. 1m 
Only 
 
 
Jan 2008 May 2008 No bubble No bubble 
Pa
lla
di
um
 Spot Jan 2010 Mar 2010 No bubble No bubble  
 
Spot Nov 2010 Feb 2011  No bubble No bubble  
This table reports the mildly explosive periods in the SDR-adjusted prices of the four principal 
COMEX precious metals that are identified using the PSY procedure with a 5% size. Following 
PSY (2015a), critical values are calculated without taking account of the minimum bubble 
length and are therefore the same in each column of the table. 
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Table 3C 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price growth 
US-PPI-Deflated Prices 
Minimum 
bubble length  7 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks 
 Start End Start End Start End 
   
 G
ol
d 
 
Spot + No bubble No bubble No bubble 
Fut. 1m 
  S
ilv
er
  
Spot + 
Mar 2006 May 2006 No bubble No bubble Fut. 1m 
Pl
at
in
um
  
Spot + 
Fut. 1m No bubble No bubble No bubble 
Pa
lla
di
um
  
 
Spot 
Fut.1 m 
 
 
Dec 2009 
 
May 2010 
Feb 2010 
Dec 2009   May 2010 No bubble 
This table reports the mildly explosive periods in the US-PPI-deflated prices of the main 
COMEX precious metals that are identified using the PSY procedure with a 5% size. Following 
PSY (2015a), critical values are calculated without taking account of the minimum bubble 
length and are therefore the same in each column of the table. 
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Table 3D 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price 
growth under wild-bootstrap-adjusted critical values 
 
Front-Month Nominal Futures Prices 
Minimum 
bubble 
length 1 week 7 weeks 
G
ol
d 
 
May 2002 Jun 2002 
No bubble 
Jan 2006 Feb 2006 
Apr 2006 May 2006 
Si
lv
er
 
Jan 2004 Jan 2004 
Feb 2004     Apr 2004 
Feb 2004 Apr 2004 
Apr 2006 May 2006 
Apr 2011 May 2011 
Pl
at
in
um
 Jan 2001 Jan 2001 
   Feb 2008     Mar 2008 
 
Dec 2003 Dec 2003 
May 2006 June 2006 
   
  P
al
la
di
um
 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 
No bubble Jan 2011 Feb 2011 
 
This table reports the mildly explosive periods in the nominal prices of the 
four principal COMEX precious metals that are identified using the PSY 
procedure with a 5% size after implementation of the wild bootstrap to 
adjust critical values for the post-crisis increase in volatility in the data.  A 
platinum negative bubble was detected in 2008 under the one-week 
minimum duration condition: given our focus on only positive bubbles, it 
does not appear in the above table.  The explosive periods in palladium in 
2011 detected when not applying the minimum duration condition were 
both one week long. 
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Table 4 
World Gold Supply and Demand (in Tonnes) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Supply 
Mine production 2,498 2,430 2,612 2,739 2,838 
Net official sector sales 484 235 34          -              -  
Old gold scrap 1,005 1,350 1,735 1,723 1,669 
Net producer hedging 11  
Total Supply 3,986 4,015 4,381 4,462 4,517 
 
Demand  
Fabrication  
Jewellery 2,423 2,304 1,816 2,020 1,975 
Other 680 723 703 767 785 
Total Fabrication 3,103 3,027 2,787 2,787 2,760 
 
Net official Sector purchases           -           -           - 77 457 
Bar hoarding 240 622 498 886 1,197 
Net producer de-hedging 436 357 234 106              - 
Implied net investment 207 10 1,130 607 103 
Total Demand 3,986 4,015 4,381 4,462 4,517 
 
Gold Price (London PM fix, 
U.S. $/oz) 695 872 972 1,224.52 1,571.52 
 
       
Table 4 reproduces the part relevant to our argument of Table 1 on page 8 of the GFMS Gold 
Survey (2013), which used source data from Thomson Reuters. Totals may not add due to 
independent rounding. Net producer hedging is the change in the physical market impact of mining 
companies’ gold loans, forwards and option positions. Implied net investment is the residual from 
combining all other Thomson Reuters GFMS data on gold supply/demand as shown in the table 
above. As such, it captures the net physical impact of all transactions not covered by the other 
supply/demand variables. 
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Table 5: Physical Bar Investment for Selected Countries and World 
Regions (in tonnes) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Western Countries 
Europe -2.3 192.2 211.2 215.2 312.8 
North America 2 30.8 37.9 22.4 15.4 
Total Western 
Countries -0.3 223 249 237.6 328.2 
 
Total Latin America -1.2 0.1 4.3 4.8 5.4 
Total Middle East 46.8 63 36.5 66 93.2 
 
Indian Sub-Continent 
India 148.6 159.9 117.5 266.3 288 
Pakistan 2.6 -4.4 -19.4 7 14.6 
Other Countries 7 6.2 2.9 7.3 16.4 
Tot. Indian Sub-Cont. 152.3 156.6 98.5 273.6 304.4 
 
Total East Asia 37.1 171.7 100.9 290.5 447.8 
of which: 
China 21 60.8 102.3 178.6 250.3 
Thailand 4.6 42.6 -10.1 63.0 103.6 
Vietnam 56.1 96.2 58.2 67.0 87.8 
Japan -56.4 -39.4 -30.8 -41.0 -47.2 
 
Total CIS (incl. 
Russia) 4.2 4.4 4.9 3.1 2.8 
 
World Total 239.9 621.6 498.5 885.7 1,197.40 
 
Table 5 reproduces the part relevant to our argument of Table 2 on page 
35 of the GFMS Gold Survey (2013), which used source data from 
Thomson Reuters. 
 
 
46 
 
Figure 1A: One-month spot nominal prices, 2000-13 
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Figure 1B: One-month futures nominal prices, 2000-13 
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Figure 1C: One-month futures SDR-adjusted prices, 2000-13 
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Figure 1D: One-month futures U.S. PPI-deflated prices 
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Figure 2A: Gold one-month futures first-differenced series            Figure 2C: Platinum one-month futures first-differenced series 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
Figure 2B: Silver one-month futures first-differenced series           Figure 2D: Palladium one-month futures first-differenced series 
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Figure 3A: Gold one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence 
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Figure 3B: Silver one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence 
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Figure 3C: Platinum one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence 
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Figure 3D: Palladium one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence 
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Figure 4A: Gold one-month futures U.S.-PPI deflated prices BSADF sequence 
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Figure 4B: Silver one-month futures U.S.-PPI deflated prices BSADF sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Figure 5A: Silver one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence with wild-bootstrap-adjusted critical values 
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Figure 5B: Platinum one-month futures nominal prices BSADF sequence with wild-bootstrap-adjusted critical values 
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Figure 6: Gold one-month lease rates BSADF sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
